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No. 13734

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action attacking the validity of Salt Lake
County's zoning ordinance restricting the development
of private property in the canyons East of metropolitan
Salt Lake City to 50 acres for each private dwelling structure.
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The action is divided into four causes in the alternative. The first in the nature of a constructive taking. The
second for damages against the individuals on the basis
of a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs of their properties
without just compensation. The third, asking for declaratory judgment asking the ordinance to be declared illegal
and unconstitutional; and the fourth, asking for writs
of mandamus requiring the defendants to issue certain of
the plaintiffs building permits. The District Court dismissed the first two causes of action before trial and dismissed the last two causes of action after trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1965, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
passed a master plan for Salt Lake County. In that master
plan they designated certain areas of the canyons to be
parks and recreation and open-space areas (Ex., 15-P, Tr.,
p. 191).
In 1970 and 1971, the United States Forest Service
negotiated with plaintiffs in an effort to acquire or trade
properties to get them out of the canyon areas (Tr., pp.
613,619,756,765,766).
In 1971, some of the plaintiffs made plans to develop
their properties in Albion Basin above Alta Utah by erecting multiple housing units thereon. In regard to this
effort, they requested from the United States Forest Service
a permit for the right of way for sewer. Said permit was
temporarily denied on November 8, 1971 (Ex. 74-D, Tr.,
p. 538). One of the reasons given therein for the refusal
to grant to plaintiffs a right of way was the desire of the
2
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Forest Service to acquire the plaintiffs' properties in this
area. Another of the reasons was that with the further
development in Alta, there wouldn't be room in the sewer,
The Forest Service owns almost all of Alta (Tr., p. 615).
Plaintiffs' properties are outlined in Ex. 44-P and Ex.
67-D. The County put temporary regulations into effect
on the 19th day of May, 1971, without publishing these
temporary regulations (Tr., p. 527, Ex. 11-P). The County
interprets commercial as being anything over a single
family dwelling (Tr., p. 423).
On August 24, 1971, the County Planning Commission, after a helicopter trip with the United States Forest
Service, met with the County Commission during a hearing on the proposed county zoning of the canyons. During
the meeting, Commissioner McClure pointed out that before the County Commission could consider adopting an
ordinance, a recommendation was needed from the Planning Commission. He stated his opinion that if the canyons
are to be enjoyed by the residents, there must be restrictions before the ground is all developed for private use.
(Ex.42-P).
Notice of a public hearing in regard to the amending
of the zoning map by reclassifying the canyons from unzoned to FR-50 was promulgated on the 30th of August,
1971 (Ex. 13-P). This Notice was published once in the
Salt Lake Tribune on the 3rd day of September, 1971, and
the hearing was held on the 4th day of October, 1971
(Ex. 14-P, Tr., p. 214). There was not an unzoned classification in the county zoning ordinance, nor did the Commission have a zoning map of the canyons (Tr., p. 395).

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At the October 1971 meeting, it was discovered that
the zoning ordinance did not provide for FR-50 zoning.
So, the County Commission set November 10, 1971 as
the time to have a hearing to establish FR-50 zoning and
other regulations. The County Commission held that this
October 6th hearing be taken under advisement until after
the November 10th meeting (Ex. 14-P). The November
10th meeting was advertised in the Salt Lake Tribune
once on the 11th day of October, 1971 (Tr., pp. 95, 128).
At the November 10, 1971 meeting (Ex. 12-P), Mr.
Barnes, in the second full paragraph, pointed out changes
made from the original proposal from the County Planning Commission. The County Commission adopted this
change in the zoning, setting forth the FR-50 zone and
other regulations including the naming of new districts
for the canyons. This ordinance was passed on the 10th
day of November, 1971 (Ex. 1-P). This ordinance was
passed under the provisions of Sec. 17-15-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended, to take effect immediately
upon publication as being necessary for the immediate
preservation of the peace, health and safety of the county
(Ex. 1-P).
The ordinance amending the classification of the
canyon from unzoned to FR-50 was passed on November
15, 1971, five days later, again to take effect immediately
upon publication, for the preservation of the peace, health
and safety of the County (Ex. 9-P).
The minutes of the November 15, 1971 meeting (Ex.
7-P), show that Commissioners McClure and Dunn expected this ordinance to be of a temporary nature, to last
4
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six months. It is indicated from Ex. 7-P that the Commissioners did not consider FR-50 zoning to be reasonable
and that they did not intend the FR-50 zoning to be permanent and they expected to change the zoning in May of
1972 so that they could complete a zoning plan.
There was some question in the minds of the County
Commissioners McClure and Dunn as to whether or not
there was a necessity for the immediate passage of the
ordinance for the immediate peace, health and safety of the
County (Tr., pp. 657, 558, 559).
On the 1st day of October, 1971 plaintiff Albion
Basin Development Company made an application with
the County for a building permit for the building of a
fourplex and plaintiff Marvin Melville made an application for a building permit for a fourplex (Ex. 24-P, 25-P,
17-P and 20-P).
On the 29th of September, 1971, the Board of Health
gave clearance for the building of plaintiff Melville's
fourplex, and on October 1, 1971, they gave clearance for
the Albion Basin fourplex (Ex. 19-P, 20-P, 22-P), (it appears that Ex. 20-P and Ex. 22-P are the same instrument).
On the 4th day of November, all requirements for the
permits were met except the zoning (Tr., p. 133).
On November 5, 1971, the County Health Department withdrew their prior approval (Ex. 21-P). The Board
of Health's action was taken after conferences with the
Zoning and Planning Department, and was on the ground
of a bigger developmet than two-fourplexes (Tr., pp.
338, 339).
5
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During the period of time the temporary regulations
were in force, the County granted five building permits for
residential construction without any reference to the Planning and Zoning Department (Ex. 37-P, 38-P, 39-P, 40-P,
41-P). Further, the County granted seven commercial
building permits without zoning approval (Ex. 29-P, 30-P,
32-P, 34-P, 35-P, 36-P).
There are many public pronouncements and indications which would lead to the conclusion that the main
purpose of the FR-50 zoning was to stop private development in the canyons and particularly plaintiffs' proposed
development until such time as the properties could be
acquired for public purposes (Ex. 16-P, 42-P, 15-P, Tr.,
pp. 345, 347, 459, 469, 470, 471, 473, 474, 477, 613, 619,
631, 639). The Forest Service told the County Commission that proposed developments were in the area of a proposed ski run (Tr., pp. 469, 470, 471), yet the Forest Service stated that there was not a formal application for a
ski run (Tr., pp. 639, 640).
The zoning has diminished the value of plaintiffs
Marvin A. Melville and Renee B. Melville and Albion
Basin Development Company's properties in the Albion
Basin above Alta. Albion Basin Development Company's
four lots have been diminished in value from $75,200 to
$17,500, or a diminution of $57,700; and on Melville
Lots 1 and 2, from $62,400 to $8,750, or a diminution of
$53,650; and on Lots 29 and 30, from $33,600 to $8,750, or
a dimunition of $24,850; and on the 20 acres above the
Albion Basin subdivision (Ex. 47-P), from $640,000 to
$15,000, or a loss of $625,000 (Tr., pp. 299, 300, 301),
6
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and the other parcels from the amounts as specified in
the Complaint (Tr., pp. 119, 287, 138), to approximately
$8,750 per individual parcel. There was no evidence in
contradiction to the plaintiffs' appraisal witnesses.
Plaintiff Albion Basin's properties have water (Ex.
58-D), and storage for the water of approximately one-half
million gallons (Tr., p. 259), Ex. 46-P). The Health Department has ultimately granted their permission for twofourplexes (Ex. 22-P, 23-P). Plaintiffs Melville and Albion
Basin have met all requirements for a building permit at
the present time except zoning (Tr., pp. 136, 139, 140).
There is no engineering reason why plaintiffs' proposed development on their Albion Basin properties can't
be carried out (Tr., pp. 333, 334). Plaintffs Albion Basin
Development Company and Marvin Melville were only
proposing to develop two-fourplexes, or eight units, and
a public water system requires ten units or 50 or more
people (Tr., p . 336). The State does not have regulations
for private water systems (Tr., p . 367).
The Health Department's withdrawal of permission
was predicated upon a larger development than two-fourplexes (Tr., p . 368). The County has no water rights in
the canyon. The plaintiff Albion Basin Development
Company, under the current health regulations for sewage,
could develop as big a development as they desired as
long as they had sufficient ground for absorbtion of the
water and large enough vaults (Tr., pp. 373, 374, 383).
Absorbtion in the Albion Basin properties was plenty adequate (Tr., p . 376). Relatively speaking, the public will
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create more pollution than a private dwelling with waste
disposal available (Tr., p. 377). The County had never
referred any proposed development to the State for approval over nine units until plaintiffs' fourplexes were
submitted (Tr., p. 383).
The Albion Basin subdivision was approved on the
10th day of December, 1962, and filed in the County Recorder's Office on January 24,1963. The Salt Lake County
Board of Health approved the subdivision on the 6th day
of November, 1962 (Ex. 43-P).
On May 31, 1972, a hearing was held to amend the
FR-50 zone to allow smaller parcel of useage and to provide other regulations in regard to that zoning (Ex. 69-D).
The Notice of Publication and the Notice of Hearing was
published one time on the 29th day of April, 1972, to
amend the zoning as proposed on May 31, 1972, and the
matter was taken under advisement (Ex. 6-P).
The amended ordinances were proposed on the 4th
day of June, 1972 and were put into effect under the provision that the passage of the ordinance was necessary for
the immediate peace, health and safety of the County and
the inhabitants thereof. The ordinances were passed some
15 days after the hearing (Ex. 3-P, 4-P, 5-P).
The minutes of the meeting held June 14, 1972 do
not set out the provisions of the ordinance as passed. The
only reference in the minutes to the zoning ordinance is
as follows: Commissioner Ralph Y. McClure made the
motion that they approve the canyon zoning as submitted
by the Planning Commission. The role was called author-
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izing the Chairman of the Board to sign the ordinance
and the Clerk to attest his signature and to have published in a newspaper of general circulation showing the
vote to be: McClure, Aye; Blomquist, Aye; Dunn, Aye.
This is found on the 10th page of Ex. 5-P.
It is the practice of the Commission to have all ordinances as passed set forth verbatim in the minutes (Tr.,
p. 529). The zoning maps of the Salt Lake County as
promulgated by the Salt Lake City Commission and the
County Planning Commission are not filed in the County
Clerk's Office (Tr., p. 526). The zoning maps which
were to be attached to the ordinance passed, being Ex. 3-P,
which would be the most current zoning ordinance in the
canyon, was not filed in the County Clerk's Office (Tr.,
p. 527). The temporary regulations as originally passed
by the County Commission, being Ex. 11-P, was not published (Tr., p. 527). The zoning maps were not filed in
the County Recorder's Office (Tr., pp. 465, 466, 467). The
zoning plan was not submitted to the State Planning Coordinator (Tr., pp. 520, 521). There were no zoning districts created to cover the canyon areas (Tr., pp. 535, 544).
There was no immediate necessity for the preservation of
peace, health or safety of the County in passing the last
zoning ordinance (Ex. 3-P, 4-P; Tr., p. 533).
On the 1st day of June, 1973, the District Court
granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First
and Second Causes of Action with prejudice (Tr., p. 108).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE Z O N I N G ORDINANCES Z O N I N G
THE CANYONS EAST OF SALT LAKE VALLEY FR-50 ARE ILLEGAL A N D INVALID
BECAUSE THE COUNTY FAILED T O COMPLY W I T H THE PROVISIONS OF THE
STATE ZONING STATUTES.
On the 19th day of May, 1971, the Salt Lake County
Commission promulgated temporary regulations covering
the canyons East of the Salt Lake Valley. Said temporary
regulations were promulgated under the provisions of
§ 17-27-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
which provides as follows:
"Promulgation of Temporary Regulations. The
board of county commissioners of any county after
appointment of a county or district planning commission and pending the completion by such commission of a zoning plan, may, where in the opinion
of the board conditions require such action, promulgate by resolution without a public hearing regulations of a temporary nature, to be effective for a
limited period only and in any event not to exceed
six months, prohibiting or regulating in any part
or all of the unincorporated territory of the county
or district the erection, construction or alteration of
any building or structure used or to be used for
any business, industrial or commercial purpose."
(Emphasis added)
This provision provides that the Board of County
Commissioners, pending the completion by the Planning
Commission of a zoning plan, may promulgate the resolution without a public hearing, regulations of a temporary
nature for a period not to exceed six months covering con10
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struction for business, industrial or commercial purposes,
and does not cover construction of a residential nature.
These temporary regulations as passed by the County
Commission pending the completion by the Planning Commission of a zoning plan, were put into effect without
any notice to the public of any sort and without complying
with the provisions of § 17-15-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, which requires that all ordinances prior
to becoming effective, shall be published in a newspaper
at least once.
The provisions of § 17-27-19, UCA, 1953, as amended, provides that the resolution can go into effect without
a public hearing. However, when such regulations have,
in essence, the full force and effect of an ordinance and
effect the property rights of the citizens of the County, such
regulations, in order to be effective, should be published
as an ordinance. McQuillin Municipal Corporation, 3rd
Ed., Vol. 5, § 15.08, p . 73:
"Resolution is said to be only a less solemn or less
usual form of an ordinance. 'It is an ordinance still
if it is anything intended to regulate any of the
affairs of the corporation', and if it is in substance
and effect an ordinance.''
(Id. § 15.03, P. 56:)
"When ordinance is Necessary".
(Id. § 15.04, P. 58-60)
"Illustrations . . . to regulate and control the manner of constructing dwelling houses and other
buildings and structures . . ."
At the end of the six month period, the County Commission, being very anxious to promulgate new zoning in
11
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the canyons, and not, at the time, having a zoning plan,
passed two ordinances, one on November 10, 1971, and
one on November 15, 1971. In these ordinances, the one
which was passed November 10th provided for the promulgation of certain zoning classifications including FR-50
which is designated as Forestry Recreation Zones 50 and
adds the names of several new planning districts. The
ordinance as passed on the 15 th of November, 1971 provides that the revised ordinance of Salt Lake County, 1966,
as amended, is hereby amended to include all of the canyons and classifies them from unzoned to Forest Recreation
Zoned, FR-50. These two ordinances were passed under
the provisions of § 17-27-14 which provides for amending
district and zoning resolution in force and provides for
publishing Notice one time.
The Notice provided for the amendment of a zoning
map whereby the zoning of all of the canyons East of Salt
Lake would be reclassified from unzoned to FR-50. In
actuality, at the time of said Notice, there was no zoning
map covering the canyons East of Salt Lake County to
amend, there was no planning district formed to cover
the canyons East of Salt Lake County, nor was there any
classification of FR-50. At the time of the passage of these
ordinances, the canyons East of Salt Lake County had no
zoning and what the County Commission was attempting
to do by amending their zoning ordinances was to add a
large part of the county to the zoning ordinance.
In order to add new territory to the zoning ordinance,
the County has to comply with the provisions of § 17-2710, UCA, 1953, as amended. This section provides that
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

prior to zoning all or any part of the County, a zoning
plan should be certified and this includes any amendment
to any previous zoning plan or any addition thereto. After
receiving the certification of the zoning plan and before
the adoption of any zoning resolution, a public hearing
shall be held and notice shall be given by four publications.
The provisions of § 17-27-10 which are the provisions
that govern new zoning, were admittedly not complied
with. The provisions of § 17-27-11 provide for the establishment of zoning districts. The last sentence of said section provides:
"Zoning, unless county-wide, shall be limited to
districts established by the board of county commissioners, either on petition as hereinbefore (hereinafter) provided or by direct action as hereinbefore
provided/'
It was admitted at the time the ordinances were
passed that zoning in Salt Lake County was not countywide. It was further admitted that districts covering the
canyons East of Salt Lake County had not been established
either by the Board of County Commissioners or on petition as provided in the zoning statutes.
Both of the sections referred to, 17-27-10 are couched
in mandatory language and provide that the notice shall
be given and in 17-27-11 shall be limited. Therefore, the
ordinances as passed by Salt Lake County covering the
canyons East of Salt Lake County are invalid and of no
force and effect since Salt Lake has not complied with the
provisions of § 17-27-10, UCA, 1953, as amended, which
covers the promulgation of new zoning, nor the provisions of § 17-27-11 which provides for zoning districts.
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Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning, 2nd ed. Vol. 3, pp.
1891-1893. "Failure to comply with provisions of
State Law governing publication of Notice of public hearing, invalidated zoning ordinance."
See Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 20 Ut. 2d 310; and
In Re: Phillip's Estate, 86 Ut 358.
In addition to failing to comply with those two provisions, the County did not comply with the provisions
of § 17-27-20, UCA, 1953, as amended, which provides for
the submitting of any zoning plan to the State Planning
Commission before finally adopting such plan. At the time
of the passage of this provision, there was not a State Planning Commission in effect. However, thereafter the State
Legislature established a State Planning Coordinator
which would effectively cover any and all duties that
might be required by a State Planning Commission.
It was the intent of the State Legislature that the State
Planning people should have the right to submit their advice and criticism in respect to such planning prior to its
finally being adopted by any county. Further, § 17-27-24,
UCA, 1953, as amended, provides that:
"Upon the adoption of any zoning ordinance or
regulation, map or maps, the Board of County
Commissioners shall file a certified copy of each in
the office of the County Clerk and Recorder which
copies shall be accessible to the public."
Salt Lake County has not and does not comply with the
provisions of § 17-27-24, UCA, 1953, as amended. Therefore, it is next to impossible for the public to determine
whether or not their properties are covered by any zoning
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regulation map or maps. The provisions of § 17-27-24,
UCA, 1953, as amended, are also couched in mandatory
terms.
The County Commission of Salt Lake County, in May
of 1972, after the promulgation of a zoning plan by zoning
commission, amended the earlier ordinance which provided that all of the canyon area be zoned FR-50 to a less
restrictive zoning in accordance with the amendment.
This, again, was promulgated after only one notice of the
zoning hearing and again failed to establish any zoning
districts covering the canyons.
Clearly then, in the County's haste to zone the canyons
where no zoning had been in force, instead of following
the provisions of the statute covering new zoning, they
attempted to do the same thing by an amendment to their
current zoning. This is particularly interesting in that the
County Commission themselves recognized the need for
the zoning plan in passing the temporary regulation and,
in essence, extended the temporary regulation for another
six months from November 1971 to May of 1972 through
the ploy of adopting the FR-50 zoning. The force and effect
of the zoning, as promulgated, and the desire of the planners and the County Commission, is to be able to direct
and control each individual proposed development as it is
submitted, which, in effect, would be spot zoning.
In the original notice as provided for the promulgation of the amendment to the zoning map, it was thought
that what the County Commission was trying to do was
amend their official map in that there was not zoning
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covering the canyons. The provisions of § 17-27-7, UCA,
1953, as amended, provides for publication of three successive weeks. However., this was not what the County
Commission was attempting to do. What they were attempting to do was to add new zoning and provide a new
zoning map covering areas of Salt Lake County which did
not have a zoning map prior to the proposed zoning, nor
did they have any classification covering the unzoned
territory.
The provisions of the statute are clear and unambiguous and before the County is allowed to substantially
effect property rights, they should comply with the provisions of the State Statutes and for failure to do so, such
zoning ordinances are illegal.
Notice has been held to be a mandatory requirement
in the passage of these restrictive ordinances.

POINT

II

THE ZONING ORDINANCES COVERING THE CANYONS EAST OF THE SALT
LAKE VALLEY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS BEING A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES WITHOUT
JUST COMPENSATION.
The FR-50 zoning ordinance covering all of the canyons East of Salt Lake County and its amendments are unconstitutional. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States provides:
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"No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval force, or in the Militia,
when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."
Section 22, Article I of the Constitution of Utah
provides:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation."
There have been many cases interpreting the provisions of the Constitution and the differentiation between
the police power of the sovereign and the provisions of the
Constitution requiring just compensation. It has been
suggested that the Constitutional provisions in regard to
the protection of private property evolved out of the
common law and the expression of such common law by
Sir William Blackstone:
"So great moreover is the regard of the law for
private property, that it will not authorize the least
violation of it; no, not even for the general good of
the whole community. If a new road, for instance,
were to be made through the grounds of a private
person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial
to the public; but the law permits no man, or set
of men, to do this without consent of the owner of
the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of
the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any
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private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the
judge of this common good, and to decide whether
it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in
nothing more essentially interested, than in the
protection of every individual's private rights, as
modeled by the municipal law. In this and similar
cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently
does, interpose and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not
by absolutely stripping the subject of his property
in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full
indemnification and equivalent for the injury
thereby sustained. The public is now considered
as an individual, treating with an individual for
an exchange. All that the legislature does is to
oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a
reasonable price; and even this is an execution of
power, which the legislature indulges with caution,
and which nothing but the legislature can perform."
Robert Malcom Kerr, The Commentaries on the
Laws of England of Sir William Blackstone, (1876)
at 109-110.
In the present case, the County is trying to acquire
the private property in the canyon areas for the use of
its citizens by passing FR-50 zoning. The real purpose of
the passage of the zoning is spelled out clearly by Commissioner Blomquist and by Commissioner McClure. Commissioner McClure spells out the intention, first at the
meeting of the Planning Commission on August 24, 1971.
Further, the minutes of the November 15th Commission
meeting points out why Commissioner McClure is voting
the way he is. (Ex. 7-P). Commissioner Blomquist spells
out in great detail the ultimate purpose of the FR-50 zoning and the desire and need felt by the Salt Lake County
Commission to restrict development until such time as
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the United States Government could acquire the property through the offices of the Forest Service even though
there is no question that the Forest Service did not have
sufficient funds to carry out the acquisition program nor
has Congress appropriated them (Tr,, pp. 469-477). The
passing of zoning ordinances for the purpose of delaying development until the public acquires the property or for
the development of public facilities, is clearly a taking of
the property in the constitutional sense and makes the
ordinances unconstitutional.
2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.3 (3rd ed.
1970) states:
"The weight of authority . . . is not in support of
this strict construction (of taking). The modern,
prevailing view is that any substantial interference
with private property which destroys or lessens its
value (or by which the owner's right to its use or
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged
or destroyed) is, in fact and in law, a 'taking* in
the constitutional sense, to the extent of damages
suffered, even though the title and possession of
the owner remains undisturbed."
Certainly under this concept, the restricting of the use of
plaintiffs' property to one house per fifty acres, particularly
when the property is less than fifty acres, is a restriction
that amounts to a taking. In this regard see United States
v. Lynch, 188 U.S. 455 (1903); United States v. 677.50
Acres of Land in Marion County, Kan., 239 F. Supp. 318
(D.C. Kan. 1965), flood control dams backing water over
private property was held to be a taking. United States v.
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373. In Robertson v. City
of Salem, 191 F. Supp. 604, the city zoning of property
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close to the State Capitol to prevent development so property could be acquired in future by the State also held to
be a taking under the Federal Constitution. See also Miller
v. City of Beaver Falls, 82 A(2d) 34, stopping development
for future public park held invalid; Peacock v. County of
Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845; Kissinger v. City of
Los Angeles, 327 Pac. 10, zoning for airport development
held invalid; Sanderson v. Wittmar, 162 N.W. 494; Chase
v. City of Glen Cove, 246 N.Y.S. 2d 975; Greenhills Home
Owners Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 202 N.E. 2d 192;
and Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 268 A(2d) 765, zoning lots no less than two acres along roads and no less
than three acres in the interior held unconstitutional.
The question evolves itself around the idea, is the
protection of the property for the use of the residents of
the County and for recreational purposes a legitimate
function of the zoning?
The landmark United States Supreme Court case that
deals with this question of police power or taking was the
case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43
S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 (1922). This case dealt with legislation dealing with mine subsidence which dealt with two
Pennsylvania State Statutes known as the Fowler Act and
the Kohler Act. The Fowler Act, establishing the Pennsylvania State Anthracite Mine-Cave Commission, and the
Kohler Act, which prohibited the mining of coal so as to
cause the subsidence of any building, structure or transportation route within the limits of a designated class of
municipalities. The Act made it unlawful so to mine anthracite coal as to cause the caving-in, collapse or subsidence
of:
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"(a) Any public building or any structure customarily used by the public as a place of resort,
assemblage or amusement, including, but not being
limited to, churches, schools, hospitals, theatres,
hotels, and railroad stations.
(b) Any street, road, bridge or other public passageway dedicated to public use or habitually used
by the public.
(c) Any tract, roadbed, right of way, pipe, conduit,
wire or other facility used in the service of the
public by any municipal corporation or public
service company as defined by the Public Service
Company law.
(d) Any dwelling or other structure used as a
human habitation or any factory, store, or other
industrial or mercantile establishment in which
human labor is employed.
(e) Any cemetery or public burial ground."
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared the
Kohler Act constitutional and specifically held the Kohler
Act a valid exercise of the state's police power. The coal
company appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The opinion was written by Justice Holmes. Holmes chose
to concentrate on the taking claim and framed the issue an
exercise of the police power to protect the public health
and safety against an ever-growing hazard, or was the Act
merely a way of getting the coal company's property
without paying for it. The question was whether the
Kohler Act tried to accomplish through police power regulation what could only be accomplished by eminent domain.
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"Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power. But obviously the implied
limitation must have its limits or the contract and
due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent
of diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act. So the question depends upon the
particular facts. The greatest weight is given to
the judgment of the legislature, but it is always
open to interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power."
"It is our opinion that the Act cannot be sustained
as an exercise of the police power, so far as it affects the mining of coal where streets or cities in
places where the right to mine such coal has been
reserved. As said in a Pennsylvania case, T o r practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right
to mine it.' Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal
Company, 256 Pa. St. 328, 331. What makes the
right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly
the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. Thus we think we are
warranted in assuming the statute does . . ."
"The general rule at least is, that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
This Pennslyvania coal case appears to be the case
that has set the perimeters for all subsequent taking cases
and the Supreme Court has rarely taken cases involving
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the regulation of land since the handing down of this
decision. It appears that the Supreme Court prefers to
leave these subjects to the State Courts.
In the present case, one piece of property in particular has been reduced in value from $640,000 to $15,000
or a dimunition of $625,000, solely related to the zoning
ordinance. When a piece of property has its highest and
best use for a multiple dwelling and then is diminished
to value to one house per 50 acres in order to protect the
canyons for public use, surely this goes beyond the rights
of the legislature and is in effect, an exercise of the
eminent domain.
In the case of Baker v. Planning Board of Farmington, 353 Mass. 141, 228 N.E. 2d 831 (1967), the land
owned by Mrs. Baker consisted of eleven acres of land
which had come to be surrounded by subdivisions of the
town of Farmington. The town had held an easement for
a ditch to conduct storm waters across the property since
1934 which had originally been sufficient to accommodate all runoff. However, as the area was developed, the
ditch became inadequate, and during heavy rains and
thaws the property served as a retention area for flood
waters.
Mrs. Baker's proposed subdivision was disapproved
because the creation of the subdivision would deprive the
town of the retention basin and as a result, overtax the
downstream drainage facilities. The Court cited the finding of a master in the case:
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"The board had but a single reason for disapproving the . . . (definitive) plan, namely, the extra
cost to the town of handling the sewage and surface drainage produced by the subdivision."
Speaking to the taking issue, it went on:
"Obviously a planning board may not exercise its
authority to disapprove a plan that a town may
continue to use the owner's land as a water storage
area and thereby deprive the owner of reasonable
use of it."
As this case demonstrates, when the regulation appears to be designated to secure land for a public facility
such as a retention basin the Courts are likely to feel that
condemnation is the only appropriate technique.
In the case of MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of
Duxbury, 356 Mass. 696, 255 N.E. 2nd 289 (1969), this
case involved the interpretation of the zoning by-law
adopted.
"For the purpose of protecting and preserving from
despoliation the natural features and resources of
the town, such as salt marshes, wetlands, brooks
and ponds. N o obstruction of streams or tidal
rivers and no excavation or filling of any marsh,
wetland or bog shall be done without proper
authorization by a special permit issued by the
Board of Appeals."
The town board had repeatedly denied an application
by Mr. MacGibbon to fill portions of estuarine wetland
which he owned. The Court in MacGibbon read Massachusetts zoning enabling legislation narrowly to prohibit
such action by towns in the state:
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"The preservation of privately owned land in its
natural, unspoiled state for the enjoyment and
benefit of the public by preventing the owner from
using it for any practical purpose is not within the
scope and limits of any power or authority delegated to municipalities under the Zoning Enabling
Act."
Professor Van Alstyne, in an excellent article written
for the Southern California Law Review, "Taking or
Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria," 44 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1, citing the general principal says:
"A regulation which restricts the use of private
property solely to governmental functions, such
as use for public schools, public parks, or public
housing as a prelude to later eminent domain proceedings, is uniformly regarded as an unconstitutional infringement of private property rights.
Even in the absence of a limitation of public activities, highly restrictive use regulations, imposed for
the purpose of preventing private developments
that would increase the cost of planned future acquisitions of the subject property for governmental
purposes, are equally invalid."
To determine what the County has in mind for plaintiffs' properties, all one has to do is look at the master
plan as set out in Ex. 15-P which shows some of plaintiffs'
properties designated for use as park, recreation and openspaces and Ex. 16-P, the general plan for Alta in Little
Cottonwood Canyon which shows some of plaintiffs'
properties planned for proposed public acquisition for
recreation. Commissioner McClure in the minutes of the
November 15, 1971 meeting (Ex. 7-P) states:
25

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"First and foremost, the canyons must be protected for public use. The general public must be allowed an opportunity to reach and see the beauty
of the canyons. Continued unrestricted private development will reduce the public recreational value
of the canyons."
Chief planner Campbell (Tr., p. 233) states:
"It (the FR-50 zone) was intended to accomplish
the purpose of the master plan. The zoning was in
FR-50 which was to create recreational, maintain
a recreational area."
Commissioner Blomquist (Tr., pp. 469-477) states
without hesitation or reservation that the purpose of the
FR-50 zoning was to block private development (and in
particular plaintiffs' private development) for public purposes. In fact, there is really no contradiction to what the
main purpose of the FR-50 zoning was by anyone at the
Trial. The purpose as of the zoning is a legal conclusion
and not a finding of fact.
The County goes to a great deal of trouble to try and
justify its restrictive zoning on the basis of its need to
protect the water supply. The County has no vested interest in the water, the water being owned by Salt Lake City.
Further, the State Legislation has provided legislation to
allow the City to have jurisdiction over its watershed which
allows the City to enact ordinances to prevent pollution
and contamination and to provide for permits for the construction and maintenance of any closet, privy, outhouse or
urinal. This provision can be found in § 10-8-15, UCA,
1953, as amended.
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The plaintiffs have met all requirements as provided by the Salt Lake County and Salt Lake City Board of
Health in regard to any question of pollution and even
though water protection is a legitimate exercise of the
police power, the private property owners cannot be expected to carry the full burden for such protection.
In Pittsburg Coal Company v. Sanitary Water Board,
4 Pa. Cmwlth 407, 286 A. 2d 459 (1972), a majority of the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found that a regulation requiring treatment of mine waste waters before discharge to be a taking of the operator's property rights.
The mine was operated at the lowest point in the basin's
seam of coal and was beneath some 100 to 350 billion
gallons of polluted waters in abandoned mines higher
on the sloping coal seam. Three natural out-flows totaled
17 million gallons a day.
The mine operator argued that of the 3.44 million
gallons of water discharged which it pumped daily from
its mine, only 1.27 million originated from its mine, the
rest coming through breaches in the barrier between the
mine and the huge adjoining pool. Therefore, it proposed
to treat only its 1.27 million gallons under the Pennsylvania Pure Streams Law. Faced with an order to cease
operations if it did not treat its discharge, it appealed to
the Courts relying heavily on the constitutional prohibition
against taking property without compensation.
The majority of the judges sitting found:
"No matter how meritorious the desired results
may be, the use and enjoyment of property by its
owner should not be burdened or impaired in the
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name of public health, safety or welfare absent a
rational relationship between the evil sought to
be cured and the use of property as contributing
to the evil. It is at this point that curing the evil
should be assumed as a direct responsibility of
government and not placed upon the property
owner in the guise of an exercise of the police
power."
In cases of this nature, there has to be a rational relationship between the evils sought to be cured and the
use of property as contributing to the evil. There is no
evidence that the restriction of the use of property to one
house per 50 acres is going to affect the quality of the
water or any other legitimate area of the police power
regulation. Particularly this is so if the reason for the restriction is to allow the use of the private properties by
the public. The concept of restricting private property
development so that the public use can be exploited is
contrary to any idea of protecting watersheds.
The Albion Basin properties of plaintiffs', even at
their most maximum use, would only bring 200 to 300
people into the area. However, with the development of a
ski lift, the Forest Service proposes to bring into the area
thousands. Common sense would indicate that thousands
of the public would pollute the water supply more than
hundreds of private dwellers wherein private dwellers
provide for the elimination of their own waste.
It is hard to understand why the County feels like
it has a right to restrict the use of private property for the
benefit of its citizens for forestry and recreation purposes.
What use does the owner have of his property as forest
or public recreation?
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Ordinarily, we wouldn't be concerned with what purpose the legislative body had in passing legislation. However, when their purpose is clear and is spelled out, then
it becomes a legitimate area of inquiry by the Courts. Salt
Lake County and the United States Forest Service have
made no bones about their desire to acquire the private
property in the canyon areas for public purposes and have
spelled out that desire in many conferences and meetings
and as the head of the Planning Department of Salt Lake
County, Mr. Douglas Campbell spelled out in his testimony (Tr., pp. 347, 348), the Forest Service and County
have a community of interest in this area.
See Gibbons and Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake, 19
Ut. (2d) 329:
"Although the wisdom and the nature of zoning
power has been left in the discretion of the City
authorities, the Courts may still intervene and set
aside their action if said ordinances are confiscatory, discriminatory, or unreasonable."
Clary v. Eatonville, 124 A.(2d) 54:
"While motives of the legislative body may not be
subject to inquiry in determining validity of legislation, there is a well recognized exception to the
rule where motivation is disclosed on the face of the
act, assimilable to declaration of legislative interest,
or as a part of legislative proceedings, and where
Mayor of Village read statement in presence of members of board of trustees as exposition of zoning
action about to be taken by the board, such statement was properly admissible in weighing validity
of board's action."
DeSena v. Gulder, 265 N.Y.S. (2d) 239:
"Rule which prohibits in case of attack, an ordinance which is valid on its face and inquiry into
29

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

legislative motivation, absent showing of fraud,
personal interest, or corruption, does not bar judicial inquiry into purpose of zoning ordinance."
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 661:
"The Courts are not bound by mere forms nor are
they to be misled by mere pretenses, they are at
liberty — indeed are under a solemn duty — to
look at the substance of things, whenever they enter
upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect
the public health, the public morals, or the public
safety, has no real or substantial relation to those
objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured
by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the Courts
to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."
Also see Wital Corp. v. Denville, N . J. 225 A(2d) 139.
There is also a question as to whether or not the ordinance is unconstitutional as an abridgment of the plaintiffs' right to contract. The FR-50 zoning restricts the development of properties to one lot per 50 acres which
means that there is no way that the owners of the property could distribute or alienate their property for parcels
less than 50 acres. You would need 100 acres to subdivide
the property into two lots. W h a t happens if someone were
to die who owned acreage in the canyon zoned FR-50?
How is it going to be divided? How can he transfer the
property to sellers or heirs?
Further, the FR-50 zoning is discriminatory. If a
person needs 50 acres to build a cabin in the canyons, only
the rich will have the opportunity of having second homes
in the canyon areas.
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There is absolutely no showing on the part of the
County that there is any relationship between the need to
restrict the use to 50 acres per lot to any evil that might
need to be corrected under the police power.
POINT III
THE ZONING AND ENFORCEMENT OF
THE BUILDING REGULATIONS ON PROPERTIES IN THE CANYONS EAST OF THE
SALT LAKE VALLEY ARE ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS, AND UNREASONABLE.
After the passage of the temporary regulations, but
prior to the passage of the FR-50 zoning in November of
1971, some of the plaintiffs made application for a building permit for two-fourplexes in a subdivision which had
been approved both as to water and sewer disposal and
all other factors some nine years prior to the building
permit application. The Board of Health granted their
approval for the two-fourplex units and upon being informed by the Zoning Department about the fact there
was no zoning and the plaintiffs involved were proposing
a larger development than two-fourplexes, they withdrew
their prior approval. In fact, plaintiffs were not proposing anything but applications for building permits for
two-fourplexes. The County considers any building over
a single residence to be commercial and, as such, under the
provisions of the temporary regulations, even though the
statute, § 17-27-19, UCA, 1953, as amended, provides for
restriction only on permits for any business, industrial or
commercial purposes. The Building Enforcement Division
in interpreting the temporary regulations, granted five
building permits for residential permits in the same area
31
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as plaintiffs' Albion Basin properties, and seven commercial permits. Even though the temporary regulations
provides that all applications for permits for commercial
purposes should be reviewed by zoning. Yet, the Building
Enforcement Division refused to grant to plaintiffs, residential permits.
The Court has just recently ruled on a question similar in Contract"BundingMortgage Exchange, a Utah corporation v. Darrell Maynes and Salt Lake County, #13608,
which opinion was filed November 4, 1974. The withholding of the permits was done for the purpose of delaying plaintiffs' construction until after the zoning ordinance
was passed.
A reading of the ordinance as found in Section VIII,
Title 22, Zoning Ordinance (Ex. 1-P) shows the following:
"Site Plan approval for Single Family Dwellings:
In order to determine compliance with this ordinance and to promote orderly and harmonious development of canyon areas, site plans for single
family dwellings shall be approved by the Zoning
Administrator prior to issuance of any building
permits. Applications for site plan approval shall
be accompanied by a site plan, elevations and transverse and longitudinal sections showing the relationship of the construction to the natural grade
and finished grade. Drawings show proposed signs,
landscaping, exterior material, color schedules and
all other information necessary to enable the Zoning Administrator to make the findings as set
forth above. Applications may be approved as submitted, approved subject to conditions, or disapproved. Actions of the Zoning Administrator shall
be subject to appeal to the Planning Commission."
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This shows the degree of control that is placed in the
hands of the Zoning Administrator. There is no indication
as to what landscapes, exterior materials or color schedules
might be acceptable, all this to be left to the asthetic judgment of the Zoning Administrator. This section is so
broad as to be incapable of understanding and places in
the hands of the Zoning Administrator too much arbitrary
power into determining what would be acceptable.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' M O T I O N TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES
OF ACTION.
If you assumed all of the fates as alleged in plaintiffs'
Complaint in regard to their First and Second Causes of
Action to be true, there is no question under the arguments as set forth in argument two that the defendants'
actions amount to a taking of the private property and,
as such, the plaintiffs should be reimbursed for such
taking.
There is no question but what plaintiffs cannot recover on both the First and Third Causes of Action, and
if the Statute is declared unconstitutional, then plaintiffs
would be reinstated to all their rights in the use of their
properies. However, these causes of action were pleaded
in the alternative as is provided in the rules, and this
option should be left with the plaintiffs.
The Second Cause of Action is founded upon the actions of the individuals and alleges a conspiracy to deprive
the plaintiffs of the value of their property in violation of

33
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

their constitutional rights. Such allegations consist of purposely devaluing plaintiffs' properties in order for the
governmental entities to acquire said properties at a future date, all actions being outside the scope of their employment. The facts as alleged are that the employees of
the County and the employees of the Federal Government
have met together and worked out a plan whereby all of
the development on plaintiffs' properties would be stopped
with the intent that either the Federal Government or
the Salt Lake County would acquire the property at a
future time at a lesser cost, or would not have to acquire
such property. These facts, as alleged, fit the definition
of criminal conspiracy which is defined under § 76-12-1,
UCA, 1953, as amended:
"If two or more persons conspire: (4) to cheat and
defraud any person of any property by any means
which are in themselves criminal, or by any means
which if executed would amount to a cheat, or to
the obtaining of money or property by false pretenses . . ."
Certainly the acts of conspiracy to deprive the plaintiffs
of the value of their property do not fit in the confines
of the defined duties of the defendants in their employment. In Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, the question of when and how actions
may be maintained against the employees of the Federal
Government and, I would assume this would apply to the
employees of the County Government, is gone into in
great depth. In that matter the Supreme Court said:
"If an action is such to create a personal liability
whether sounding in tort or in contract, the fact
that the defendant, as an officer, is an instrumen-
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tality of the sovereign does not forbid a Court from
taking jurisdiction over a suit against him, since
the principle that an agent is liable for his own
torts applies to acts of public officers or public instrumentalities.
A suit for specific relief against a public officer is
not a suit against the sovereign, where the suit is
directed against action which the officer purports
to take as an individual and not as an official, or
which is beyond statutory limitations of his powers,
or is taken under statute or order claimed unconstitutionaL"
In the Larson case, the question was not so much
whether or not you could sue the agent in damages, but
whether or not you could bring an injunctive action
against him. There, the Court ruled that if the damages
sought to be recovered were against the individual and not
the government, then the suit could be maintained and the
Court will further maintain an action enjoining the agents
from acting where the officer's powers are limited by
statute, his actions beyond those limitations are considered
individual and not sovereign actions, the officer is not
doing the business which the sovereign has empowered
him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign
has forbidden. The second type of case is that in which
the statute or ordinance conferring power on the officer to
take action in the sovereign's name is claimed to be unconstitutional. Then there is a right of action against the
individual.
In the present circumstances, the actions alleged are
not only illegal as per the criminal code and tortious on
that score, but are in violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Since the plaintiffs are not seeking to re35
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cover in the second cause of action against the sovereign,
i.e., the County, but are only seeking to recover against the
individuals for the tortious acts alleged, and since the
agents and officers are acting outside the scope of their
authority in violation of the plaintiffs* constitutional
rights, there is ample ground for granting damages against
said individuals.
The main theory is not that the defendants passed an
ordinance, but that they met together to deprive plaintiffs of the value of their property and whether or not the
defendants were employees of some governmental body or
not would make no difference, for if any individual conspired to defraud the plaintiffs of their property, the plaintiffs would have an action to recover for such conduct.
See also Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643.
POINT

V

THERE IS NO NEED TO GO TO THE
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF IF THE RELIEF BEING
SOUGHT IS A TESTING OF THE VALIDITY
OF THE ORDINANCE THAT WOULD GIVE
THE JURISDICTION.
The provisions of § 17-27-15, UCA, 1953, as amended, provide:
"Any zoning resolution of the board of county
commissioners may provide that the board of adjustment may in appropriate cases and subject to
appropriate principles, standards, rules, conditions
and safeguards set forth in the zoning resolution,
make special exceptions to the terms of the zoning
regulations in harmony with their general purpose
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and intent. The commissioners may also authorize
the board of adjustment to interpret the zoning
maps and pass upon disputed questions of lot lines
or district boundary lines or similar questions, as
they may arise in the administration of the zoning
regulations." (Emphasis Added).
The Board of Adjustment has jurisdiction in regard to
zoning matters, and when there is no zoning, there
is no need to refer to the Board of Adjustment.
Certainly the Board of Adjustment is not in a position to rule on the validity of the zoning ordinance giving
them jurisdiction. These plaintiffs are not seeking to find
relief from any determination of the zoning ordinance.
They are seeking to have the zoning ordinance declared
invalid as being completely illegal and unconstitutional.
The Board of Adjustment has no authority or jurisdiction
to make any such interpretation of the zoning ordinance
they might be trying to rule on. The rule that the party is
required to exhaust all administrative remedies does not
apply when the party is questioning the validity of the
ordinance that gives the administrative body jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
Defendant Salt Lake County and its officers and employees, in the Fall of 1971, passed FR-50 zoning on all
of the canyons East of Salt Lake County. This zoning was
new zoning and not an amendment of any existing zoning
ordinance. The defendants admittedly passed the canyon
zoning ordinance which provided for the requirement of
50 acres per residential lot, without following the requirements of the State Zoning Statute. Further, the County
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has not filed their zoning maps with the Salt Lake County
Clerk's Office nor the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office,
nor have they given the state planning people a chance to
review their zoning as required by Statute.
The zoning ordinance was passed without the required notice given for new zoning ordinances and later
in the Spring of 1972, after a plan was developed, they did
not pass the new zoning ordinance, but amended the faulty
ordinance passed in the Fall, again without forming
zoning districts. So, clearly, the FR-50 zoning, as passed
in the Fall of 1971, is invalid as not complying with the
Statute's original requirements and the amendment to the
invalid ordinance would also be invalid.
The purpose of the FR-50 zoning was to acquire
the private property for recreational purposes for the
public and to stop development until the private property could be acquired by a public agency and, as such,
the zoning was unconstitutional. The purpose of the
zoning is to be determined by the facts in the matter and is
a legal conclusion.
There is no relationship shown by the County between the necessity of 50 acres per lot and any evil that
would need to be cured under the police power of the
sovereign. The requirement of 50 acres per residential
lot is unreasonable and diminishes the value of the property to an extent that it leaves the owner of the property
with no reasonable use for his property and amounts to a
taking. Further, the limitation of 50 acres per lot restricts
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the property owner's right to distribute or alienate his
property to the extent of its being a violation of his right
to contract under the Constitution.
The defendants arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably denied to two of the plaintiffs building permits
on an approved subdivision for two-fourplexes, such
denial being for the purpose of effecting the FR-50 zoning
prior to those plaintiffs getting their building started, and
those plaintiffs are entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring the Building Enforcement Department of the Salt
Lake County to issue their building permits as applied for.
Therefore, the Trial Court's ruling should be reversed
and the current canyon zoning should be declared illegal
and unconstitutional and the County should be required
to issue the building permits as applied for.
Respectfully submitted,
Joseph S. Knowlton
Suite 204 Executive Building
45 5 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for PlaintiffsAppellants
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